Noel Canning and Remedial Obligation Under the Constitution by Greabe, John M.
University of New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship University of New Hampshire – School of Law
1-1-2014
Noel Canning and Remedial Obligation Under the
Constitution
John M. Greabe
University of New Hampshire School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – School of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars'
Repository. For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. Greabe, "Noel Canning and Remedial Obligation Under the Constitution," 100 VA L. REV. ONLINE 47 (2014).
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ONLINE
VOLUME 100 OCTOBER 2014 47-62
ESSAY




AFTER the Supreme Court issued its decision in National Labor Re-
I lations Board v. Noel Canning,1 many observers expressed relief
that the ruling's disruptive effect was likely to be relatively contained.2
True, the Court unanimously concluded that President Obama violated
the Constitution's Recess Appointments Clause when, in 2012, he ap-
pointed three commissioners to the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") during a very brief, "intra-session" Senate recess.3 But a ma-
jority of the Justices explicitly rejected Noel Canning's broader claims,
accepted below by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, that
* Professor of Law and Faculty Chair, Warren B. Rudman Center for Justice, Leadership
& Public Policy at the University of New Hampshire School of Law. I am grateful to Profes-
sor Toby Heytens, who, in reviewing an earlier article of mine, posed the question that this
essay addresses. I also thank my UNH Law colleague Professor Leah Plunkett for extremely
helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. Finally, I thank the editors of the Vir-
ginia Law Review Online in particular, Derrick Aud and Sean Park for deciding to pub-
lish my essay and for their excellent editorial assistance.
1 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
21 say "likely" because the Noel Canning Court did not discuss how its decision should be
operationalized.
3 An "intra-session" Senate recess occurs within one of the two one-year Senate sessions
that are held between each congressional election. By contrast, an "inter-session" Senate re-
cess occurs between the two sessions. See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 256(-61.
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the Constitution bars the President from making any recess appoint-
ments during intra-session Senate recesses, and from using the recess
appointments power to fill any vacancies extant prior to the recess in
which the appointment is made. Amy Howe, writing for SCOTUSblog,
explained why the nation had dodged a bullet with this comparatively
modest decision:
So what exactly does all of this mean, going forward? First and fore-
most, it means that the three recess appointments directly involved in
this case - to the NLRB - are invalid. That in turn means that any de-
cisions in which those three NLRB commissioners participated while
they were recess appointees are invalid. But nothing in the Court's rul-
ing suggests that it would invalidate other, earlier recess appoint-
ments. To the contrary, the Court made clear that, over two centuries,
presidents had made only a very small handful of recess appointments
during recesses that were [too brief to allow for a recess appointment].
And later on, it contrasted its approach with that of Justice Scalia -
whose approach, it contended, "would render illegitimate thousands of
recess appointments reaching all the way back to the founding era.",
4
As the quoted passage shows, conclusions such as "invalid" tend to
flow naturally from the premise "unconstitutional," especially where, as
in Noel Canning, the unconstitutional act in question implicates a gov-
ernment agent's power to act. But to assume that the decisions of the
improperly appointed NLRB commissioners are void as a constitutional
matter-the clear implication of the descriptor "invalid"-is to default
to ontological characterization, rather than to analyze the question of
what to do about the decisions in the procedural contexts in which it will
arise, as legal realism teaches. Such an assumption thus prevents us from
asking the right questions about remedial obligation under the Constitu-
tion in the wake of Noel Canning.
In fact, when we situate the question within a broader and more con-
textually appropriate analysis of when courts regard remedies for consti-
tutional violations to be constitutionally compelled, we see that there is
little reason to assume that the decisions of these commissioners are ipso
4 Amy Howe, Court Strikes Down Recess Appointments: In Plain English, SCOTUSblog
(June 26, 2014, 3:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/court-strikes-down-recess-
appointments-in-plain-english/.
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facto without legal effect. In future cases, courts asked to provide reme-
dies for the constitutional wrong identified in Noel Canning may well
decide to invalidate Board decisions in which the improperly appointed
commissioners participated.5 But that would be a question of remedial
lawmaking as a matter of constitutional common law. The Constitution
would not require them to do so.
This Essay explains why in three parts. Part I summarizes the facts
and procedural history of the Noel Canning decision. Part II elaborates
on why we should not assess the question of remedial obligation under
the Constitution after Noel Canning "in the air" 6 and outside of the pro-
cedural contexts in which it will arise (if it does in fact arise7) in future
court cases. Part III argues that, when we situate the question of remedy
for the constitutional wrong identified in Noel Canning within a broader
look at when courts regard remedies for constitutional violations to be
constitutionally compelled, we see that invalidation of the appointees'
decisions is not required by the Constitution. This Essay concludes with
some preliminary thoughts about how, with the question of constitution-
al necessity put to the side, courts and other entities responsible for im-
plementing remedies might develop doctrines appropriate for use in cir-
cumstances such as those presented after Noel Canning and, more
generally, after a government official who has purported to act under
color of law is found to have been improperly empowered by an ap-
pointing authority.
5 This assumes, of course, that the NLRB will not concede decisional invalidity or other-
wise take actions that will keep the issue from arising in future litigation. Compare, e.g., the
NLRB's response to New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010). New Process
Steel held that the NLRB lacks authority to make decisions or take actions without a lawfully
appointed quorum that is, three out of its five Board members under 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)
(2012). From January 2008 until March 2010, the NLRB operated with three of its five seats
vacant. During that time, the two Board members issued about 550 decisions. Following the
Supreme Court's ruling, the NLRB took measures to obviate additional court challenges to
these 550 decisions. The NLRB issued a statement summarizing these measures. See Press
Release, National Labor Relations Board, Background Materials on Two-Member Board (on
file with author).
6 Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (observing that legal
concepts such as negligence must be given content relationally and contextually, and that
"[p]roof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
7 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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I. NOEL CANNING: ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND 8
The Constitution provides two ways in which the President may ap-
point federal officers. The principal method is charted in the Appoint-
ments Clause, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, which states that the Presi-
dent
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judg-
es of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
ments. 9
The Appointments Clause thus requires Senate confirmation of "princi-
pal" (that is, non-"inferior") "Officers," and also has been read to re-
quire Senate confirmation of those "inferior Officers" that Congress by
statute makes subject to presidential appointment with the advice and
consent of the Senate. 10
The Constitution also makes provision for presidential appointments
when the Senate is in recess. This second method is described in the Re-
cess Appointments Clause, Article II, Section 2, Clause 3, which states:
"The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session."11
The NLRB, a federal agency empowered to investigate and adjudicate
unfair labor practices, is comprised of up to five "Officers" appointed by
" A recent Congressional Research Service Report provides a more detailed recitation of
the background to the Noel Canning decision. See David H. Carpenter and Todd Garvey,
Cong. Research Serv., R43032, Practical Implications of Noel Canning on the NLRB and CFPB
2 5 (2013), available at http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files/2013/04/Practical-Implications.pdf.
9 U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
10 Officers of the United States, whether principal or inferior, are persons who exercise
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976). They must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments
Clause or Recess Appointments Clause. Id. Officers subject to appointment may be contrast-
ed with federal employees, who are lesser functionaries subordinate to United States officers.
Id. at 126, n.162.
11 U.S. Const. art. 2, § 2, cl. 3.
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the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 12 On January 4,
2012, President Obama invoked the Recess Appointments Clause to ap-
point Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F. Griffin, Jr., as
three of these officers. 13 The Senate was then in a three-day, intra-
session Senate recess because, on December 17, 2011, it had by unani-
mous consent adopted a resolution to take a series of brief recesses be-
ginning the next day, December 18, 2011, and concluding on January
23, 2012, when it planned to return for ordinary business. 14 Pursuant to
that resolution, the Senate would hold pro forma sessions (at which no
Senate business would be conducted) every Tuesday and Friday until the
January 23, 2012 return for ordinary business.15 January 4, 2012 fell on
a Wednesday, between the pro forma sessions held on Tuesday, January
3, 2012, and Friday, January 6, 2012.16 As of that date, Flynn's nomina-
tion had been pending in the Senate for approximately a year, while the
nominations of Block and Griffin had been pending for several weeks. 17
Following these appointments, on February 8, 2012, the NLRB (a ma-
jority of which was then comprised of President Obama's three January
4, 2012, recess appointees) issued an administrative decision concluding
that Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi products, had un-
lawfully failed to reduce to writing and execute a collective bargaining
agreement with a labor union. 18 Noel Canning challenged the lawfulness
of this determination before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing
that the three commissioners who joined the Board pursuant to President
Obama's January 4, 2012, recess appointments had been invalidly ap-
pointed, and that the Board therefore lacked the quorum necessary for it
to proceed.19 The D.C. Circuit agreed and issued a broad decision hold-
12 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012).
13 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
14 Id.; see also id. at 2573 76 (accepting that the Senate was actually in session on those
days that served to subdivide the period from December 17, 2011, to January 23, 2012, into a
series of short, intra-session recesses).
15 Id. at 2557.16 id.
17 Id.
1' Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (2012); see also Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
19Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557; see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012) (providing for ju-
dicial review before the D.C. Circuit); id. § 153(b) (providing for a three-member quorum);
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687 88 (2010) (holding that the Board
cannot exercise its statutory powers in the absence of a lawfully appointed quorum).
2014]
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ing that the appointments were unlawful because the President cannot
invoke the Recess Appointments Clause to make appointments either
during intra-session Senate recesses or to fill vacancies that pre-date the
recess in which they are made.20
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the D.C. Circuit's judg-
ment that the appointments in question were not lawfully made under
the Recess Appointments Clause. 21 But a majority of the Justices explic-
itly rejected the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that the Clause neither author-
izes appointments during intra-session recesses nor permits appoint-
ments to fill vacancies that were extant prior to the recess in which they
are made. 22 Instead, the majority narrowly ruled that the three-day, intra-
session recess during which the challenged appointments were made
was simply too brief a recess to trigger the President's power under the
Clause. 23 Henceforth, a Senate recess "of more than 3 days but less than
10 days [will be] presumptively too short to fall within the [Recess Ap-
pointments] Clause. 24
II. NOEL CANNING AND REMEDIAL OBLIGATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION: THE NECESSITY OF CONTEXTUALIZING THE INQUIRY
As noted above, it seems natural to view the question of remedial ob-
ligation under the Constitution after Noel Canning as simple and
straightforward in view of the Court's holding that NLRB Commission-
ers Flynn, Block, and Griffin were unconstitutionally appointed to their
offices. The logic of such an argument would run as follows: All deci-
sions handed down by the NLRB through these commissioners were
made without a quorum; therefore, all decisions handed down by the
NLRB through these commissioners were made without the constitu-
2 0 Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557 58 (summarizing the D.C. Circuit's holdings, which
are set forth in an opinion published at 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).21 Id. at 2578; see also id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito).
22 See id. at 2561.
23 Id. at 2566.
24 Id. at 2567. The majority explained why it hedged a bit in its holding: "We add the word
presumptively' to leave open the possibility that some very unusual circumstance a na-
tional catastrophe, for instance, that renders the Senate unavailable but calls for an urgent
response could demand the exercise of the recess-appointment power during a shorter
break." Id. '
[Vol. 100:47
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tionally requisite government power; as a result, all decisions handed
down by the NLRB through these commissioners are null and void as a
constitutional matter.
By one account, acceptance of such a line of analysis would result in
the nullification of some 700 reported and unreported decisions issued
by the NLRB from January 4, 2012, until the end of July 2013,25 when
the impasse over President Obama's NLRB nominees was finally re-
solved by Senate confirmation of five new appointees.26 It also might be
thought to call into question the legality of enforcement actions brought
by ten regional directors of the NLRB who were approved by the tainted
Board, and prior delegations of authority from the tainted Board to its
Acting General Counsel. 27 But happily-at least for those who do not
welcome the introduction of chaos into government functioning-this
binary, legitimate/illegitimate take on the issue is rooted in a formalistic
and anachronistic approach to legal analysis that skirts the question fu-
ture courts may well have to decide: Is a party aggrieved by a decision
of what proved to be an improperly constituted NLRB entitled to the
remedy of judicial vacatur as a matter of constitutional right?
One of the most valuable lessons of legal realism is that we tend to
take wrong turns when we reify transcontextual legal concepts such as
"government power" and assume that they contain ontological character-
istics that are ascertainable outside of the various procedural contexts in
which our legal system gives them definition. As Judge Posner colorful-
25 See G. Roger King & Bryan J. Leitch, The Impact of the Supreme Court's Noel Canning
Decision Years of Litigation Challenges on the Horizon for the NLRB, 60 Construction
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 2973, at 521 (July 10, 2014), available at http://www.bna.com/impact-
supreme-courts-n17179891624/.
6 The Senate confirmed five appointees to the NLRB on July 30, 2013. See Ramsey Cox,
Senate confirms all five NLRB members, The Hill (July 30, 2013, 10:15 PM), http://thehill.conl
blogs/floor-action/senate/314503-senate-votes-to-confirm-all-five-nkrb-members.
27 King & Leitch, supra note 25, at 521 22. Note, however, that "[o]n July 18, 2014, the
National Labor Relations Board unanimously ratified all administrative, personnel, and pro-
curement matters taken by the Board from January 4, 2012 to August 5, 2013." Press Re-
lease, National Labor Relations Board, NLRB Officials Ratify Agency Actions Taken Dur-
ing Period When Supreme Court Held Board Members Were Not Validly Appointed (Aug.
4, 2014), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-officials-ratify-
agency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court. Then, on July 30, 2014, regional
directors appointed by the Board during that time period ratified all actions they took, or that
were taken on their behalf, during that same time period. See id.
2014]
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ly put it in a discussion of "domicile" which, like the concept of gov-
ernment power, arises in a number of different legal domains:
Unfortunately, in this age of second homes and speedy transporta-
tion, picking out a single state to be an individual's domicile can be a
difficult, even a rather arbitrary, undertaking. Domicile is not a thing,
like a rabbit or a carrot, but a legal conclusion, though treated as a fac-
tual determination for purposes of demarcating the scope of appellate
review. And in drawing legal conclusions it is always helpful to have
in mind the purpose for which the conclusion is being drawn. The
purpose here is to determine whether a suit can be maintained under
the diversity jurisdiction, a jurisdiction whose main contemporary ra-
tionale is to protect nonresidents from the possible prejudice that they
might encounter in local courts. 28
One need not concede the accuracy of Judge Posner's description of di-
versity jurisdiction's main contemporary rationale, or approve of the
manner in which he conducts his purposive analysis, to appreciate the
incisiveness of the point that legal concepts must be given content in a
contextually sensitive manner.
The same point may be made with respect to the concept of govern-
ment power-even government power that derives entirely from the
Constitution-through principles familiar to every first-year law student.
A court may have the constitutional power to adjudicate a claim against
a foreign defendant, but simultaneously lack the constitutional power to
adjudicate a different claim over which it has subject matter jurisdiction
against the same foreign defendant.29 Government power with respect to
that defendant is not an on/off switch. Indeed, even within the context of
subject matter jurisdiction-the strictest and least forgiving of govern-
ment-power concepts-matters are not binary. It may well be that sub-
ject matter jurisdiction either exists or does not exist with respect to one
party's claim against another party. But that does not mean that a final
judgment issued by a court later shown to lack subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the claim is a legal nullity as a matter of constitutional law. In
fact, courts typically will not set aside final judgments as to which ap-
pellate rights have expired on a mere showing that the adjudicating court
28 Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991).
29 See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
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lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim at the time of adjudica-
tion.3 ' Rather, courts asked to vacate judgments on this ground look to a
separate body of law-the law of remedies-in determining what they
should do.
This last point is telling for purposes of analyzing how to evaluate
remedial obligation under the Constitution after Noel Canning. As with
the concepts of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, to say that the
NLRB acted without constitutional authority during the period when
three of its commissioners were improperly appointed is not necessarily
to say that all actions taken by the Board during the period in question
must be treated as legal nullities under the Constitution. A subset of the
law of remedies-that governing a court's discretion to fashion or with-
hold remedies for wholly concluded constitutional violations, depending
on what the public interest requires-should guide the analysis. Under
that body of law, Noel Canning should not be seen to render automati-
cally void, as a matter of constitutional law, all decisions of the improp-
erly appointed commissioners.
III. NOEL CANNING AND REMEDIAL OBLIGATION UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION: LESSONS FROM THE LAW OF CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES
The Noel Canning decision is not, of course, the first time that the
Supreme Court has held that a government agent purporting to act under
color of law did not lawfully hold the power it had been exercising. For
example, in Nguyen v. United States, the Court vacated judgments af-
firming criminal convictions entered by a Ninth Circuit panel that un-
lawfully included an Article IV territorial court judge.31 Similarly, in
Ryder v. United States, the Court vacated a Court of Military Appeals
decision upholding a conviction affirmed by a panel of the Coast Guard
Military Review despite the fact that the panel included two judges who
were unconstitutionally appointed under the Appointments Clause.
3 2
On the civil side, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., the Court upheld a judgment dismissing an adversary
30 See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 12 (1963); Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Bax-
ter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 176 77 (1938).
31 539 U.S. 69, 71 73 (2003).
32515 U.S. 177, 179 (1995).
2014]
Virginia Law Review
proceeding brought by a party in bankruptcy against a third party on the
ground that the federal statute purporting to allow the bankruptcy judge
to adjudicate the proceeding constituted an unconstitutional grant of Ar-
ticle III adjudicatory jurisdiction to an Article I court.33 And, in Buckley
v. Valeo, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional under the Appoint-
ments Clause the appointments of four members of the Federal Election
Commission.
3 4
It is interesting to compare and contrast how the Court treated the
question of remedy-an issue that, again, the Noel Canning Court did
not address-in these four cases. In Buckley, even though the Court in-
validated the Commissioners' appointments, it also held: "[T]he Com-
mission's inability to exercise certain powers because of the method by
which its members have been selected should not affect the validity of
the Commission's administrative actions and determinations to this
date .... The past acts of the Commission are therefore accorded defac-
to validity.... "35 Similarly, in Northern Pipeline, the Court held that its
judgment should only apply prospectively, and the Court stayed the en-
try of judgment for a period of time so that Congress could, in the inter-
im, restructure the bankruptcy courts in a constitutional manner.3 6 But in
the more recent Ryder and Nguyen decisions, the Court took a more
formalistic approach.
In Ryder, the Court rebuffed the government's entreaty to follow
Buckley's remedial holding, which the government had characterized in
its briefing as an application of the "de facto officer doctrine." The de
facto officer doctrine is an old rule that "confers validity upon acts per-
formed by a person acting under the color of title even though it is later
discovered that the legality of that person's appointment or election to
office is deficient. 3 7 The Ryder Court noted that Buckley had not explic-
itly relied on the de facto officer doctrine and that, even if its remedial
" 458 U.S. 50, 87-88 (1982).
14 424 U.S. 1,143 (1976) (per curiam).
35 Id. at 142. The Court also issued a temporary stay to provide "Congress an opportunity
to reconstitute the Commission .... allowing the present Commission in the interim to func-
tion de facto in accordance with the substantive provisions of the [Federal Election Cam-
paign] Act." Id. at 143.
36See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88.
37 Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180 (citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 440 (1886)).
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holding might be regarded as a species of that doctrine, it should not be
extended beyond its facts.38 The Ryder Court also distinguished three
prior criminal cases in which the de facto officer doctrine was applied
because Ryder had raised a timely objection to the judges' appointments
before the panel that included those judges, and Ryder's complaint was
rooted in the Appointments Clause and not the mere "misapplication of
a statute."3 9 And the Court brusquely dismissed the government's re-
quest that it apply its holding only prospectively.40
In Nguyen, the majority brushed aside the fact that Nguyen had first
raised his challenge before the Supreme Court, and it differentiated be-
tween the "merely technical" statutory defects in earlier cases where the
de facto officer doctrine was applied and the one before it, which the
Court described as involving "a strong policy concerning the proper ad-
ministration of judicial business. 41 Indeed, in vacating Nguyen's con-
viction, the majority quoted a line from a nineteenth century case that
comes very close to expressing the binary, ontological view of govern-
ment power that this Essay seeks to refute: "If the statute made [the
judge] incompetent to sit at the hearing, the decree in which he took part
was unlawful, and perhaps absolutely void, and should certainly be set
aside or quashed by any court having authority to review it by appeal,
error or certiorari.,
42
So do these cases teach anything that is useful? At best, they demon-
strate that courts need a rationalized set of remedial doctrines to apply
following a holding that an agent of government-corporate or human-
purporting to act under color of law lacked the constitutional authority to
wield the adjudicatory power that it had been exercising. But that is
about all that can be said on their behalf. So the question therefore be-
comes, how should courts rule when faced with a request to vacate the
decisions of a government agent subsequently found to have been im-
properly appointed?
" See id. at 183 84.
'9 Id. at 182.
40 See id. at 184 85 & n.3.
41 Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 77 78 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Id. at 78 (quoting American Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co., 148 U.S.
372, 387 (1893)).
2014]
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As should by now be clear, I do not favor the formalistic answer that
all decisions of such an agent are automatically null and void. Consider
the disruptive effect on government operations such a rule would engen-
der and the distortive, law-freezing pressures it would bring to bear on
judges reluctant to unleash chaos through an exercise of judicial re-
view. 43 But more can be said against such a rule than that it is unattrac-
tive from a practical perspective. As sketched above in Part II, and ex-
plained in greater detail below, it also would be entirely at odds with the
modern Court's approach to remedies for constitutional violations in
cases, such as Noel Canning, Nguyen, Ryder, and Buckley, where the
constitutional violation in question was wholly concluded at the time the
Court addressed its merits.44
Nor do I favor the resuscitation of selectively prospective judicial rul-
ings through non-retroactivity doctrines, as some thoughtful commenta-
tors have advocated in support of broader arguments that courts must
develop new ways to manage the costs of constitutional innovation.45
The Supreme Court appropriately removed from the judicial toolbox se-
lectively prospective rulings 46 and, more generally, all forms of non-
retroactive judicial rulings in Griffith v. Kentucky47 and Harper v. Va.
Dep't of Taxation.48 As I argue in a forthcoming article,49 selectively
prospective judicial rulings materially differ from other, legitimate doc-
43 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 Yale L.J. 259,
271 75 (2000) (explaining that there would be far less constitutional innovation by courts
without remedy-limiting doctrines that reduce the costs of such innovation).
44 Northern Pipeline differs from these other cases in that the party with standing to press
the constitutional claim before the Supreme Court had never suffered a constitutional viola-
tion because the lower courts had not unconstitutionally forced it to litigate before an Article
I court. See 458 U.S. at 56 57.
45 See Toby J. Heytens, The Framework(s) of Legal Change, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 595, 599
600 (2012); Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 Yale
L.J. 922, 927 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1735 36 (1991).
46 Selectively prospective rulings benefit only the litigant in the case announcing the ruling
and any party affected byfuture conduct of the sort being held unlawful. In Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967), the Court held that Article III requires that rulings announcing
new rights benefit the parties in the cases in which they are announced.
47 479 U.S. 314, 316, 328 (1987) (holding that courts may not issue non-retroactive rulings
on direct review of criminal convictions).
48 509 U.S. 86, 90 (1993) (extending Griffith to the civil context).
49 See John M. Greabe, Remedial Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication, 62 Buff. L.
Rev. 881 (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2305629.
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trines that withhold remedies for wholly concluded constitutional viola-
tions-for example, the qualified-immunity rule,50 exceptions to the ex-
clusionary rule,51 harmless-error rules, 5 2 and the remedy-limiting rule of
Teague v. Lane applicable on collateral review.53 Unlike these other doc-
trines, selectively prospective judicial rulings violate the norms of Arti-
cle III by treating similarly situated litigants differently and permitting
courts to issue purely advisory opinions that function as prospective leg-
islation.5
4
Moreover, selectively prospective rulings are unnecessary for manag-
ing the costs of constitutional change. Although it has not adequately
explained itself, the modern Court has charted a constitutionally appro-
priate course in developing and applying doctrines that act to withhold
remedies for constitutional violations in those cases-but only in those
cases-where withholding a remedy for such a violation is constitution-
ally permissible and otherwise in the public interest. Buried within the
Court's unrationalized yet largely principled pattern of behavior, we find
the answer to the question whether the Constitution places courts under
an unyielding obligation to vacate the decisions of unconstitutionally
appointed government officials when parties with standing ask them to
do so. The answer to that question is no.
The key lies in appreciating the different ways the Court has handled
ongoing and wholly concluded constitutional violations from a remedial
perspective. While the Court has properly regarded the judiciary as un-
der an obligation to halt ongoing constitutional violations rooted in gov-
ernment custom or policy (at least so long as the issue is raised by means
of a justiciable claim in a proper forum), it also has appropriately re-
garded the subconstitutional, substitutionary remedies sought when the
wrong in question is wholly concluded at the time of adjudication as
50 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813, 819 (1982).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984).
52 See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 24 (1967).
5' See 489 U.S. 288, 300-10 (1989). This remedy-limiting doctrine is, unfortunately, still
unhelpfully characterized as a species of non-retroactivity doctrine on occasion. See Chaidez
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013). For more on why this is a mischaracteriza-
tion, see Greabe, supra note 49, at 5 n.9.
54 See Greabe, supra note 49, at 37-41.
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contingent and subject to being withheld when the public interest so re-
quires. Both of these points are further discussed in recent work."
For present purposes, it suffices to observe that the post-hoc judicial
vacatur of a decision rendered by an unconstitutionally appointed gov-
ernment agent is much like an award of damages to the victim of a con-
stitutional tort; or the exclusion of evidence at the trial of a victim of a
Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment violation; or the vacatur on appeal of
a judicial judgment infected by constitutional trial error. Like these other
subconstitutional forms of remedy,5 6 such a vacatur cannot halt or undo
the constitutional wrong. Rather, it serves only to provide a party with
substitutionary relief for the constitutional harm suffered. 17 And as with
these other forms of remedy, it can have significant, negative conse-
quences for innocent third parties,58 who may have planned their affairs
in reliance on the validity of the decision or act that is being challenged.
Thus, as with these other forms of substitutionary remedy, the decision
whether to issue such a vacatur is properly balanced against the public
interest.
To be sure, substitutionary remedies for constitutional violations are
vital to the proper functioning of our constitutional system. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has gone too far in restricting their availability in a num-
ber of contexts.59 But they inherently differ from specific remedies di-
55 See id.; see also John M. Greabe, Constitutional Remedies and Public Interest Balanc-
ing, 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 857, 859 60 (2013).
56 Because the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that the federal Constitution pro-
vides no right to an appeal, see, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.C., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996), and because
the Constitution certainly does not guarantee other procedural mechanisms by which one can
seek to reopen or attack a final judgment, decision, or act by a government agent, there cer-
tainly can be no freestanding constitutional right to a remedy whose delivery mechanism is a
matter of legislative grace.
57 Note that the adverse effect of the unconstitutionally appointed official's decision or act
may well be ongoing from the perspective of the victim. But this adverse effect is not the
constitutional violation. The violation, rather, is that an entity exercised government power
on the claimant when it should not have held that power in the first instance. This subtle
point is perhaps best illustrated by noting, for example, that the constitutional claimant in
Noel Canning might well have been found to have engaged in a violation of federal labor
law by a properly constituted NLRB.
58 Cf. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered.").
59 See John M. Greabe, A Better Path for Constitutional Tort Law, 25 Const. Comment.
189, 192 93 (2009) (similar); John M. Greabe, Iqbal, al-Kidd and Pleading Past Qualified
Immunity: What the Cases Mean and How They Demonstrate a Need to Eliminate the Im-
Noel Canning and Remedial Obligation
rected at ongoing constitutional violations rooted in custom or policy,
whose constitutional necessity is strongly implied by the existence of a
judiciary entrusted with judicial review to help maintain the separation
of powers, our federalist structure, and individual rights. I have already
mentioned their tendency to impose costs on innocent third parties, and
their inability to halt or undo the wrong at which they are directed. They
also tend in the main to be responsive not to unconstitutional custom or
policy-that is, unconstitutionality at the law-making level-but rather,
to the wholly concluded discretionary decisions and acts of those many
individuals in whom we necessarily entrust government power at the
federal, state, and local levels. They are important, and they usually
should be available. But they are not, and should not be, automatically
available as a matter of constitutional right for every wholly concluded
constitutional wrong.
CONCLUSION
If one accepts that vacatur of the decisions and acts of unconstitution-
ally appointed government agents is not constitutionally compelled, we
must begin fashioning remedial doctrines appropriate for contextual ap-
plication. My preliminary view is that we would simplify things enor-
mously if we did away with exotica such as the de facto officer doctrine,
accepted the demise of non-retroactivity doctrines, and viewed the issue
through much the same lens as the harmless-error and plain-error doc-
trines that courts apply in deciding whether to vacate judicial judgments
infected by constitutional errors committed by judges and prosecutors in
munity Doctrines from Constitutional Tort Law, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1, 2 (2011) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court should reform the qualified-immunity doctrine in a number of
respects); John M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for "Unnecessary" Constitutional
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403, 408 (1999); John M.
Greabe, Objecting at the Altar: Why the Herring Good Faith Principle and the Harlow Qual-
ified Immunity Doctrine Should Not Be Married, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 1, 3 (2012)
(arguing for a narrower concept of "good faith" in formulating exceptions to the exclusion-
ary rule); John M.M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of a Record? Harmless-Error Review of
Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 819,
820 21 (1994) (arguing for a narrower concept of harmless error with respect to instructional
errors that interfere with the jury's fact-finding function).
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connection with criminal trials. 60 Errors of the sort committed by the
President in Noel Canning are certainly "structural," and they certainly
are of constitutional dimension. When challenged in a timely way at any
point in a direct review process, they certainly should yield a remedy.61
But like other structural errors, they should be subject to forfeiture rules
if they have not been timely raised,62 and they should not automatically
yield relief when challenged post-hoc through collateral attack mecha-
nisms. 63 Most importantly, their availability to individual litigants
should always be balanced against the public interest and, in particular,
the chaos and costs that they are likely to engender.
60 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 22 (1967) (detailing how constitutional er-
rors should be reviewed for harmlessness); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 32,
736 (1997) (detailing how claims of error that have been forfeited should be reviewed for
plain error under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b)).
61 Cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (acknowledging that structural errors as
to which appellate rights have been preserved should automatically yield a remedy).
62 Cf. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997) (stating that structural errors are
not subject to automatic reversal but rather should be reviewed for plain error under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(b) and Olano).
63 Cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (stating that all procedurally de-
faulted federal claims cannot be pressed on collateral review unless there are both cause for
the default and prejudice resulting therefrom).
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